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Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) focused on the construction of a wide-ranging database 
consisting of a series of measures of varying ideas of what democracy is or ought to be, a wide 
variety of some 50 meso-level indices of different components of such ideals of democracy, 
and about 450 specific indicators. As such, its goal is orthogonal to Polity, Freedom House, 
and other sources on democracy, human rights, and governance. V-Dem is distinct in several 
regards in addition to its unique level of disaggregation, by the combination of: Historical data 
extending back to 1900 and for a selection to 1789 for most countries in the world; use of 
multiple, independent coders for each evaluative question; inter-coder reliability tests 
incorporated into a custom designed Bayesian item-response theory measurement model; 
provision of confidence bounds for all point estimates associated with expert-coded questions 
as well as for all indices; multiple indices reflecting varying theories of democracy; fully 
transparent aggregation procedures; and that all data freely available, including original 
coder-level judgments (exclusive of any personal identifying information). 
At the core of V-Dem is the idea to measure democracy in all its main varieties 
acknowledging that there is no consensus on what it is beyond rule by the people (Gallie 1956; 
Held 2006; Shapiro 2003: 10–34). A search of the literature reveals seven key principles that 
inform much of our thinking about democracy: electoral, liberal, majoritarian, consensual, 
participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian. Each of these principles represents a different way 
of understanding “rule by the people.” Taken together, they offer a fairly comprehensive 
accounting of the concept as employed today. The V-Dem project has set out to measure 
these principles, and the core values which underlie them.  We also capture political institutions, 
powers, dynamics, which do not directly reflect any of the principles. Thus, our data are also relevant 
for studies that are not focused on democracy per se. 
V-Dem is a unique collaboration involving over 3,200 scholars and other experts relying 
on a complex research infrastructure to provide data on some 450 indicators some of which 
extend back from the present to 1789 and covers almost all countries in the world. Multiple, 
independent coders are employed for each (evaluative) question along with inter-coder 
reliability tests built into a custom-designed Bayesian measurement model. Ratings and 
indices are provided along with Bayesian confident intervals following open, transparent and 
replicable aggregation rules. The resulting 19 million data is a public good, provided free of 
charge. This article outlines the methodological considerations, choices, and procedures 
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guiding the development of the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project.2  
 
“Countries” and Indicators 
For the purposes of discussing our methodology, we start at the level of identification of 
countries and indicators. In identifying political units we look for those that have the 
reasonable levels of autonomy and/or are operational units of governance. These sorts of 
units are referred to as “countries,” even if they are not fully sovereign. This means, for 
example, that V-Dem provides a continuous time-series for Eritrea coded as an Italian colony 
(1900-41), a province of Italian East Africa (1936-41), a British holding administered under the 
terms of a UN mandate (1941-51), a federation with Ethiopia (1952-62), a territory within 
Ethiopia (1962-93), and an independent state (1993-).  
There are some 450 unique democracy indicators in the V-Dem dataset, some of which 
are coded all the way back to 1789, while all go back to at least 1900. The V-Dem dataset 
contains many indicators that we do not include in the component and democracy indices 
discussed below but are nevertheless relevant for democracy from different points of view. 
We have strived to be as comprehensive as possible.  
 
Types of Indicators 
The V-Dem indicators fall into four main types: (A*) factual indicators pre-coded by members 
of the V-Dem team and provided in the surveys for Country Coordinators and –Experts to 
ensure they code the same entity such as a specific election, or a certain head of state, (A) 
factual indicators coded by members of the V-Dem team, (B) factual indicators coded by 
Country Coordinators and/or members of the V-Dem team, (C) evaluative indicators based on 
multiple ratings provided by experts, and (D) composite indices.  
We gather Type (A*) and (A) data from existing sources as listed in the Codebook. These 
data are largely factual in nature. Principal Investigators and Project Managers supervise the 
                                                          
2 V-Dem is a massive, global collaborative effort. Collaborators include Program Managers, Regional Managers, 
International Advisory Board members, the V-Dem Institute staff, Post-Doctoral Fellows, and Associate Researchers, 
Research Assistants, and Country Coordinators. We are especially indebted to over 3,000 Country Experts. 
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collection carried out by research assistants connected to the project, with input from V-
Dem’s Country Coordinators.  
Country Coordinators, under the supervision of Regional Managers, gather Type (B) 
data from country-specific sources. For a number of countries, research assistants at the V-
Dem Institute have coded these indicators during the updates when the original series going 
from 1900 to 2012 were extended to 2017. This sort of coding is also largely factual in nature. 
Type (C) data requires evaluation about the de facto state of affairs in a particular 
country at a particular point in time. Country Experts code these data. These experts are 
generally academics (about 84%) or professionals working media, or public affairs (e.g., senior 
analysts, editors, judges); about 2/3 are also nationals of and/or residents in a country and 
have documented knowledge of both that country and a specific substantive area. Generally, 
each Country Experts code only a selection of indicators following their particular background 
and expertise (e.g. the legislature, see further below).  
Given the relative scarcity of true experts on the 18th and 19th century politics of many 
countries (particularly smaller ones), the recruitment rules and processes were different for 
the Historical (pre-1900) part of the time series. Historical experts with a high degree of 
general knowledge of the country’s political system in the relevant time period, were 
recruited, typically one or two per country. These experts – typically political historians or 
historically oriented political scientists – were given longer time to finish their task and were 
expected to both spend time going through source material, and the same expert code all 
questions for a country.  
Type (D) data consists of indices composed from (A), (B), or (C) variables. They include 
cumulative indicators such as “number of presidential elections since 1900” as well as more 
highly aggregated variables such as the components and democracy indices. 
 
Country Expert Recruitment 
Type (C) coding by Country Experts involves evaluative judgments. We take a number of 
precautions to minimize error in the data and to gauge the degree of imprecision that remains. 
We endeavor to find a minimum of five Country Experts to code each country-year for 
every indicator (except for the historical period pre-1900). We pay a great deal of care and 
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attention to the recruitment of these scholars following an exacting protocol. First, we identify 
a list of potential coders for a country (typically 100-200 names per country) with substantial 
input from Regional Managers and Country Coordinators using their intimate knowledge of a 
country. Research assistants located at the V-Dem Institute (University of Gothenburg) also 
contribute to this list, using readily available information drawn from the Internet. Other 
members of the project team (Principal Investigators and Project Managers) may also suggest 
candidates. At present, our database of potential Country Experts contains some 20,000 
names. 
We compile a set of basic information for each potential Country Expert: biography, list 
of publications, website information, affiliation, country of origin, current location, highest 
educational degree, current position, and area of documented expertise (relevant for the 
selection of surveys the expert might be competent to code) to make sure we adhere to the 
five recruitment criteria.  
The most important selection criterion is an individual’s expertise in the country(ies) 
and surveys they may be assigned to code. This expertise is usually signified by an advanced 
degree in the social sciences, law, or history; a record of publications; or positions in outside 
political society that establish their expertise in the chosen area (e.g. a well-known and 
respected journalist; a respected former high court judge).  
The second criterion is connection to the country to be coded. By design, three out of 
five (60%) of the Country Experts of a particular country-survey should be nationals or 
permanent residents of that country. Exceptions are made for a small number of countries 
where it is difficult to find in-country coders who are both qualified and independent of the 
governing regime, or where in-country coders might be placed at risk. This criterion helps us 
to avoid potential Western or Northern biases in coding and to ensure in-depth, qualitative 
knowledge. 
The third criterion is the prospective coder’s seriousness of purpose, i.e. her willingness 
to devote time to the project and to deliberate carefully over the questions asked in the 
survey. Sometimes, personal acquaintanceship is enough to convince a Regional Manager and 
a Country Coordinator that a person is fit, or unfit, for the job in this respect. Sometimes, this 
feature becomes apparent in communications with Program Managers that precede the offer 
to work on V-Dem.  
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The fourth criterion is impartiality. We therefore avoid those individuals who might be 
beholden to powerful actors – by reason of coercive threats or material incentives – or who 
serve as spokespersons for a political party or ideological tendency. Close association (current 
or past) with political parties, senior government officials, politically affiliated think-tanks or 
institutes is grounds for disqualification. In cases where finding impartial coders is difficult, we 
aim to include a variety of coders who, collectively, represent an array of views and political 
perspectives on the country in question. 
The final criterion is obtaining diversity in professional background among the coders 
chosen for a particular country. For certain areas (e.g., the media, judiciary, and civil society 
surveys) such diversity entails a mixture of academics and professionals who study these 
topics. It also means finding experts who are located at a variety of institutions, universities 
and research institutes.  
Using this process, we have recruited over 3,200 scholars and experts from every corner 
of the world. About 30 percent of the Country Experts are women,3 and a vast majority have 
PhDs or MAs and are affiliated with research institutions, think tanks, or similar organizations. 
With the exception of the second and fifth criteria for recruiting experts to the post-1900 V-
Dem coding the same criteria apply to the recruitment of the pre-1900, Historical Country 
Experts.  
While the identity of the V-Dem staff and core team members is publicized on the V-
Dem website, we do not reveal the identity of our Country Experts. Several reasons lie behind 
this decision:  
 There are a number of repressive countries in the world where the participation in V-
Dem may be dangerous to Country Experts and/or their relatives; 
 It is impossible to predict with complete accuracy which country may become 
repressive in the future and by that, making participation in the V-Dem surveys 
dangerous; 
 V-Dem data is used in evaluations and assessments internationally in ways that could 
affect a country’s status. Thus, there are incentives for certain countries and other 
                                                          
3 The number of women among the ranks of our Country Experts is lower than we would have liked, and it occurred despite 
our strenuous efforts. However, it reflects gender inequalities with regard to education and university careers in the world. 
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actors to try to affect ratings; 
 Following national and EU laws and regulations, it is prohibited to share Personal 
Identifying Information (PII).  
Hence, we preserve Country Expert confidentiality by a strict set of security policies and 
V-Dem has decided to neither confirm nor deny the identities of Country Experts, with only 
one exception: Given the lower political sensitivity of coding the pre-1900 period, the 
Historical country experts were given the option to be publicly acknowledged as the expert 
for their country, or to remain anonymous.  
The C-indicators coded by Country Experts are organized into four clusters and eleven 
surveys:4 
1. Elections  
 Political parties/electoral systems  
2. Executive 
 Legislature 
 Deliberation 
3. Judiciary  
 Civil liberty 
 Sovereignty 
4. Civil society organizations 
Media 
 Political equality 
 
We suggest (but do not require) that each Country Expert code at least one cluster. On 
average, experts have coded seven surveys, or two clusters and we have on average almost 
20 experts per country. In consultation with the Country Coordinators and Principal 
Investigators, Regional Managers suggest which Country Expert might be most competent to 
code which surveys. All Country Experts carry out their coding using a specially designed online 
survey. The web-based coding interfaces are directly connected with a postgreSQL database 
where we store the original coder-level data. The coding interface is an essential element of 
V-Dem’s infrastructure. It consists of a series of web-based functions that allow Country 
Experts and Country Coordinators to (1) log in to the system using their individual, randomized 
                                                          
4 In the historical (pre-1900) coding, there are ten surveys, as “Deliberation” is omitted. However, three questions from this 
latter survey are included also in the historical coding (two are placed in the Civil Society survey and one in the Political 
Equality survey). Further, the Sovereignty survey is renamed “The State” in the historical coding, as this survey is 
expanded with several new questions on the features and capacity of state institutions. 
8 
 
username and self-assigned, secret password; (2) access the series of surveys assigned to 
them for a particular country (or set of countries); and (3) submit ratings for each question 
over a selected series of years. The interface also requires that, for each rating, experts assign 
a level of confidence, indicating how confident they are that their rating is correct (on a scale 
of 0-100, where each 5-percent interval has a substantive anchor point, providing another 
instrument for measuring uncertainty associated with the V-Dem data.  
Finally, in order to ensure wide recruitment of potential experts, and minimize 
confusion due to unfamiliarity with English, we translate all type-C questions, as well as coder-
instructions and documentation for them, into five other languages: Arabic, French, 
Portuguese, Russian, and Spanish. Country Experts get a small remuneration as a token of 
appreciation for their time. 5 
To manage and facilitate this enormous data collection task, we have designed over 50 
sophisticated tools among the V-Dem management interfaces in the software. There are tools 
for management of countries, rounds of surveys, surveys and questions, country coordinators, 
regional managers, for logging activities, analyses of progress on recruitment as well as coding, 
planning, and general management. It was, we admit, a much larger undertaking than initially 
envisioned. 
Bridge-, lateral-, and vignette coding 
Throughout implementation of the project, we have encouraged Country Experts to code 
multiple countries over time - bridge coding. An expert who is competent to code more than 
one country receives the same set of surveys for the same time period as the original country 
they coded. Bridge coding helps us better model how Country Experts make judgments 
between different response categories and allows us to incorporate this information into the 
estimated score for each country-indicator-year/date. As of March 2018, we have over 600 
bridge coders – about 20 percent of all Country Experts. On average, these experts code 2.4 
                                                          
5 From what we can tell, this is not a significant threat to coding validity. Few individuals seem to have been 
motivated to conduct this arduous coding assignment for purely monetary reason. Further strengthening this 
point, there seems to be no relationship between the wealth of the country and our ability to recruit coders: 
we have faced challenges getting experts to agree to conduct coding for the poorest as well as the richest 
countries in the world. 
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countries.  
Other coders have expertise on a series of countries political situation but only for 
recent years. We encourage such Country Experts to perform the simpler type of cross-
country comparison called lateral coding. That is, in addition to their original coding of one 
country over time (e.g., from 1900 to the present), they code a number of countries for a 
single point in time – January 1, 2012 – focusing on the same set of questions. Some Country 
Experts have coded up to 14 countries. More typically, lateral coding extends to a few 
countries. To date, 350 Country Experts (about 12%) have performed lateral coding, covering 
on average of 5.5 countries and 6.3 surveys. As a result, lateral coding by regular Country 
Experts has provided linkages equivalent to over 1,100 “fully covered” countries – in other 
words, countries that have been “cross-coded” by lateral/bridge coding across all indicators 
in the dataset.  
A final type of data, used solely for modelling purposes, is ratings on anchoring 
vignettes. Anchoring vignettes are descriptions of hypothetical cases that provide information 
necessary to answer a given survey question (King & Wand 2007). We have developed such 
vignettes for all thresholds of all C-type questions, and all coders are being asked to rate a 
random selection of such anchoring vignettes. These synthetic cases provides information 
about how coders translate their perceptions about cases into ordinal ratings, providing 
another tool for measuring, and adjusting for “differential item functioning” (DIF, see further 
below). Vignettes provide bridging data that requires no specific case knowledge, enabling us 
to obtain bridging information across coders regardless of which real-world cases they have 
coded. This is even more important for the Historical (pre-1900) part of the coding, given that 
there only 1-2 experts per country, hence, all historical coders rate identical vignettes covering 
all questions. 
Measurement 
Our discussion here on measurement is relevant primarily for C-type indicators. While we 
select experts carefully, we expect that they exhibit varying levels of reliability and bias, and 
may not interpret questions consistently. In such circumstances, the literature recommends 
that researchers use measurement models to aggregate diverse measures where possible, 
incorporating information characterized by a wide variety of perspectives, biases, and levels 
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of reliability (Bollen & Paxton 2000, Clinton & Lapinski 2006, Clinton & Lewis 2008, Jackman 
2004, Treier & Jackman 2008, Pemstein, Meserve & Melton 2010). Therefore, to combine 
expert ratings for a particular country-indicator-year to generate a single “best estimate” for 
each question, we employ methods inspired by the psychometric and educational testing 
literature (see, e.g., Lord & Novick 1968, Jonson & Albert 1999, Junker 1999, Patz & Junker 
1999).  
The underpinnings of these measurement models are straightforward: they use 
patterns of cross-rater (dis)agreement to estimate variations in reliability and systematic bias. 
In turn, these techniques make use of the bias and reliability estimates to adjust estimates of 
the latent—that is, only indirectly observed—concept in question. These statistical tools allow 
us to leverage our multi-coder approach to both identify and correct for measurement error, 
and to quantify confidence in the reliability of our estimates.  Variation in these confidence 
estimates reflect situations where experts disagree, or where little information is available 
because few raters have coded a case. These confidence estimates are tremendously useful. 
Indeed, to treat the quality of measures of complex, unobservable concepts as equal across 
space and time, ignoring dramatic differences in ease of access and measurement across 
cases, is fundamentally misguided, and constitutes a key threat to inference. 
The majority of the C-type questions are ordinal:  they require Country Experts to rank 
cases on a discrete scale.  Although we strive to write questions and responses that are not 
overly open to interpretation, we cannot ensure that two coders look at descriptions in a 
uniform way. In other words, one coder’s rating “1” may be another coder’s “0”; a problem 
known as scale inconsistency, or differential item functioning (DIF). Therefore, we use 
Bayesian item response theory (IRT) modeling techniques (Fox 2010) to estimate latent polity 
characteristics from our collection of expert ratings for each ordinal (C) question. Marquardt 
and Pemstein (2018) provides an in-depth technical discussion of the measurement model 
and its output, including full model code. 
 We fit ordinal IRT models to each of our ordinal (C) questions. These models achieve 
three goals. First, they work by treating coders’ ordinal ratings as imperfect reflections of 
interval-level latent concepts. Our IRT models assume that, for example, election violence 
ranges from non-existent to endemic along a smooth scale, and coders observe this latent 
characteristic with error. Therefore, while an IRT model takes ordinal values as input, its 
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output is an interval-level estimate of the given latent trait (e.g. election violence). Interval-
valued estimates are valuable for a variety of reasons; in particular, they are especially 
amenable to statistical analysis. Second, IRT models allow for the possibility that coders have 
different thresholds for their ratings (e.g. one coder’s somewhat might fall above another 
coder’s almost on the latent scale), estimate those thresholds from patterns in the data, and 
adjust latent trait estimates accordingly. Therefore, they allow us to correct for this potentially 
serious source of bias (DIF).6 This is very important in a multi-rater project like V-Dem, where 
coders from different geographic, cultural, and other backgrounds may apply differing 
standards to their ratings. Finally, IRT models assume that coder reliability varies, produce 
estimates of rater precision, and use these estimates—in combination with the amount of 
available data and the extent to which coders agree—to quantify confidence in reported 
scores. 
 Since our coders generally rate one country based on their expertise, it is necessary to 
utilize bridge- and lateral coders as well as anchoring vignettes. Essentially, this coding 
procedure allows us to mitigate the incomparability of coders’ thresholds and the problem of 
cross-national estimates’ calibration (Pemstein et al. 2017). While helpful in this regard, our 
tests indicate that, given the sparsity of our data, even this extensive bridge-, lateral-, and 
vignettes coding is not sufficient to fully solve cross-national comparability issues. We 
therefore employ a data-collapsing procedure. This procedure relies on the assumption that 
as long as none of the experts change their ratings (or their confidence about their ratings) for 
a given time period, we can treat the country-years in this period as one year. The results of 
our statistical models indicate that this technique is extremely helpful in increasing the weight 
given to bridge- and lateral coders, and thus further ameliorates cross-national comparability 
problems. 
 As a final note, our model diverges from more standard IRT models in that it employs 
empirical priors. Specifically, we model a country-year’s latent score for a given variable as 
being distributed according to a normal distribution with an appropriately wide standard 
                                                          
6 Given currently available data, we must build in assumptions—formally, these are known as hierarchical priors—that restrict 
the extent to which coders’ threshold estimates may vary.  Informally, while we allow coders to look at ordinal rankings like 
somewhat and almost differently, we assume that their conceptions are not too different.  We are working to relax these 
assumptions by collecting more data.  
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deviation parameter and a mean equal to the raw mean of the country’s scores, weighted by 
coder confidence and normalized across all country-years. More formally,  𝑍𝑖  ~ 𝑁(𝜇𝑖, 1), 
where 𝑍 is the latent score for country-year 𝑖, and 𝜇 is the normalized confidence-weighted 
average from the raw data.7 In contrast, most standard models employ a vague mean 
estimate, i.e. 𝑍𝑖 ~ 𝑁(0,1). Our approach of using empirical priors is similar to the standard 
approach: our wide standard deviation parameter still allows for the model output to diverge 
from prior as the data warrant. However, our approach incorporates our actual prior beliefs 
about a country’s score and thus yields more accurate measures. Especially in the case of 
countries with extreme values, a traditional approach risks biasing output toward the mean. 
V-Dem’s four-pronged approach to dealing with DIF—using IRT models, recruiting 
bridge and lateral coders, have coders answer anchoring vignettes, and employing empirical 
priors—had helped to produce a dataset that stands up well to tests of validity (McMann 2016, 
McMann et al 2016, Sigman & Lindberg 2015, Teorell, Coppedge, Skaaning & Lindberg 2016).  
 
Identifying Bias 
We then employ a number of tests, some of which are incorporated into the measurement 
models and others of which are applied ex post to examine the validity of model output.  
First, we have used data from the post-survey questionnaire that every V-Dem coder 
completes to identify potential sources of bias. This survey delves into factors of possible 
relevance to coder judgments, such as personal characteristics like sex, age, country-of-origin, 
education and employment. It also inquires into opinions that Country Experts hold about the 
                                                          
7 There are two sets of exceptions to our use of the normalized confidence-weighted average of coder scores as empirical 
priors. First, we do not include data from lateral coders in the computation of the empirical priors. We exclude these data 
from this procedure because the purpose of lateral codings is to better estimate thresholds of experts, not provide data 
regarding the specific country year they are lateral coding. In principle, excluding these data will assist in the estimation of 
lateral coders' thresholds, since it anchors their thresholds to country-year values for which we have a great deal of data 
(i.e. lateral-coded country years).  Second, we offset the contribution of historical coders (i.e. coders who code years before 
1900) and new coders (i.e. coders who only code years after 2005) to the empirical prior by the average difference between 
these coders and those coders who coded the years 1900-2012 in overlap years (i.e. those years both these sets of coders 
and the full time period coders coded). More specifically, we determine the confidence-weighted average score of the full-
time period coders for a specific country in the overlap years, and subtract the equivalent average for new coders of the 
same country from this value. We then add this difference to the new coders' scores for a given country for when computing 
the prior (restricting the resulting values such that they cannot exceed the range of the ordinal data). We use the same 
procedure for historical coders (i.e. we compute offsets for new and historical coders separately). The purpose of these 
offsets is as follows. Experts who code different time periods may have different cognitive reference points for levels of the 
ordinal scale, and thus provide different values for the same latent construct due to DIF. The offsets ameliorate this problem 
by fixing the prior for a given country-year to a consistent reference point, i.e. the scores of those coders for whom we have 
the most data (those experts who coded the full time period). 
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country they are coding, asking them to assign a point score on a 0-100 scale summarizing the 
overall level of democracy in the country using whatever understanding of democracy they 
choose to apply. We ask the same question about several prominent countries from around 
the world that embody varying characteristics of democracy/autocracy. Finally, the 
questionnaire contains several questions intended to elicit the coder’s views about the 
concept of democracy. We have run extensive tests on how well such individual-level factors 
predicts country-ratings but have found that the only factor consistently associated with 
country-ratings is country of origin (with “domestic” coders being harsher in their judgments). 
This is, hence, also the only individual-level characteristic included in the measurement model 
estimates.  
 
Correcting Errors 
We correct problems with factual questions (A and B-type indicators) whenever the Principal 
Investigators, in consultation with the relevant Project Managers, become convinced that a 
better (i.e., more correct) answer is available.  
 We handle raw data provided on evaluative questions (C-type indicators) with great 
restraint. We fully expect that any question requiring judgment will elicit a range of answers, 
even when all coders are highly knowledgeable about a subject. A key element of the V-Dem 
project – setting it apart from most other indices that rely on expert coding – is coder 
independence: each coder does her work in isolation from other coders and members of the 
V-Dem team (apart from clarifying questions about the process). The distribution of responses 
across questions, countries, and years thus provides vital insight into the relative 
certainty/uncertainty of each data point. Since a principal goal of the V-Dem project is to 
produce informative estimates of uncertainty we do not wish to tamper with evidence that 
contributes to those estimates. Arguably, the noise in the data is as informative as the signal. 
Moreover, wayward coders (i.e., coders who diverge from other coders) are unlikely to have 
a strong influence on the point estimates that result from the measurement model’s 
aggregation across five or more coders.  
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Versions of C-Variables 
The V-Dem dataset then contains A, B, C, and D indicators that are all unique. In addition, to 
facilitate ease of use for various purposes, the C-variables are supplied in three different 
versions (also noted in the V-Dem Codebook):  
1. “Relative Scale” has no special suffix (e.g. v2elmulpar). This version of the variables 
provides country-year (country-date in the alternative dataset) point estimates from the 
V-Dem measurement model described above. The point estimates are the median 
values of these distributions for each country-year. The scale of a measurement model 
variable is similar to a normal (“Z”) score (i.e. typically between -5 and 5, with 0 
approximately representing the mean for all country-years in the sample) though it does 
not necessarily follow a normal distribution.  
“Measure of Uncertainty” – Measurement Model Highest Posterior Density (HPD) 
Intervals – have the suffixes – "codelow" and "codehigh" (e.g., v2elmulpar_codelow and 
v2elmulpar_codehigh). These two variables demarcate one standard deviation upper 
and lower bounds of the interval in which the measurement model places 68 percent of 
the probability mass for each country-year score. The spread between "codelow" and 
"codehigh" is equivalent to a traditional one standard deviation confidence interval. 
 
2. “Original Scale” has the suffix “_osp,” (e.g. v2elmulpar_osp). In this version of the 
variables, we have linearly translated the measurement model point estimates back to 
the original ordinal scale of each variable (e.g. 0-4 for v2elmulpar_osp) as an interval 
measure. The decimals in the _osp version indicate the distance between the point 
estimate from the linearized measurement model posterior prediction and the 
threshold for reaching the next level on the original ordinal scale. Thus, a _osp value of 
1.25 indicates that the median measurement model posterior predicted value was 
closer to the ordinal value of 1 than 2 on the original scale. There is no conventional 
theoretical justification for linearly mapping ordinal posterior predictions onto an 
interval scale.8 However, since the _osp version maps onto the coding criteria found in 
                                                          
8 The main theoretical and pragmatic concern with these data is that the transformation distorts the distance between point 
estimates in the Measurement Model output. For example, the distance between 1.0 and 1.5 in the _osp data is not 
necessarily the same as the distance between a 1.5 and 2.0. 
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the V-Dem Codebook, and is strongly correlated with the Measurement Model output 
(typically at .98 or higher), some users may find the _osp version useful in estimating 
quantities such as marginal effects with a clear substantive interpretation. Measures of 
uncertainty are available also for this version indicates by the suffixes – "codelow" and 
"codehigh" (e.g., v2elmulpar_osp_codelow and v2elmulpar_osp_codehigh).  
 
3. “Ordinal Scale” has the suffix "_ord" (e.g. v2elmulpar_ord). This method also translates 
the measurement model estimates back to the original ordinal scale of a variable as 
integers. More precisely, it represents the most likely ordinal value on the original 
codebook scale. Specifically, we assign each country-year a value that corresponds to its 
integerized median ordinal highest posterior probability category over Measurement 
Model output. Measures of uncertainty are available also for this version indicates by 
the suffixes – "codelow" and "codehigh" (e.g., v2elmulpar_ord_codelow and 
v2elmulpar_ord_codehigh).  
Finally, for users who rather want to employ the full posterior distributions that the 
measurement models produce as the output, these are available as well. Please follow 
the links on the website to where these files are stored.  
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Components 
The next step in our methodology is to use indicators to construct component-indices. For 
example, V-Dem’s Electoral Democracy Index consists of five sub-components built from a 
number of indicators that together capture Dahl’s seven institutions of polyarchy: freedom of 
association, suffrage, clean elections, elected executive, and freedom of expression and 
alternative sources of information. The component indices measuring the liberal, deliberative, 
participatory, and egalitarian properties of democracy typically have several sub-components. 
For example, the liberal democracy component consists of three sub-components, each 
captured with its own index:  the Equality before the law and individual liberty index; the 
Judicial constraints on the executive index; and the Legislative constraints on the executive 
index. 
In addition to the component and sub- component indices that are part of the V-Dem 
democracy indices conceptual scheme, members of the V-Dem team have constructed a 
series of indices of lower-level concepts such as civil society, party institutionalization, 
corruption, civil liberties, accountability, and women’s political empowerment. In total, V-
Dem offers 5 democracy indices and 71 such mid-level indices.  
We use two techniques when aggregating. For the first step, going from indicators to 
components, we aggregate the latent factor scores from measurement model (MM) output. 
More specifically, we use relevant theoretical distinctions in the literature to group interval-
level MM output into sets of variables that share a common underlying concept. We then 
randomly select 100 draws from each variable’s posterior distribution, and use a 
unidimensional Bayesian factor analysis (BFA) to measure this latent concept sequentially for 
each randomly-selected draw in each grouping of variables. We then combine the posterior 
distributions of the latent factor scores in each variable group to yield the latent factor scores.  
For the next level in the hierarchy – a component, or a democracy index depending on 
the complexity of the conceptual structure – we take the latent factor scores from the 
separate BFAs and use in combination in constructing the “Higher Level Indices” (HLIs). HLIs 
are thus composite measures that allow the structure of the underlying data to promulgate 
through the hierarchy in the same way as the BFAs do  – and critically carry over the full 
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information about uncertainty to the next level in order to avoid allowing the aggregation 
technique artificially increase the estimated confidence – while being faithful to the 
theoretically informed aggregation formula.  
 
The Democracy Indices 
At this point, V-Dem offers separate indices of five varieties of democracy: electoral, liberal, 
participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian. The high-level indices, measuring core principles 
of democracy, are referred to as democracy indices.9 The electoral principle of democracy 
embodies the core value of making rulers responsive to citizens through periodic elections, as 
captured by Dahl’s (1971, 1989) conceptualization of “polyarchy.” We consider this measure 
fundamental to all other measures of democracy: we would not call a regime without 
elections “democratic” in any sense.  
The liberal principle of democracy embodies the intrinsic value of protecting individual and 
minority rights against a potential “tyranny of the majority” and state repression. The 
participatory principle embodies the values of direct rule and active participation by citizens 
in all political processes. The deliberative principle enshrines the core value that political 
decisions in pursuit of the public good should be informed by a process characterized by 
respectful and reason-based dialogue at all levels, rather than by emotional appeals, solidary 
attachments, parochial interests, or coercion. The egalitarian principle holds that material and 
immaterial inequalities inhibit the actual use of formal political (electoral) rights and liberties. 
Ideally, all groups should enjoy equal de facto capabilities to participate. The majoritarian 
principle of democracy reflects the belief that a majority of the people must be capacitated to 
rule and implement their will in terms of policy. The consensual principle of democracy 
emphasizes that a majority must not disregard political minorities and that there is an inherent 
value in the representation of groups with divergent interests and view.  
Because we believe both the necessary conditions and family resemblance logics are 
valid for concepts of electoral democracy (or polyarchy since this is an operationalization of 
Dahl’s institutional concept), our aggregation formulas include both; because we have no 
                                                          
9 Two principles – majoritarian and consensual – have proven impossible for us to operationalize and measure fully in a 
coherent and defensible way. Instead, we provide indices measuring some core aspects of these two principles, the 
Divided party control index (D) (v2x_divparctrl), and the Division of power index (D) (v2x_feduni) respectively.  
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strong reason to prefer the additive terms to the multiplicative term, we give them equal 
weight. The Electoral Democracy Index (v2x_polyarchy) is formed by taking the average of, on 
the one hand, the weighted average of the indices measuring freedom of association (thick) 
(v2x_frassoc_thick), clean elections (v2xel_frefair), freedom of expression and alternative 
sources of information (v2x_free_altinf), elected officials (v2x_elecoff), and suffrage 
(v2x_suffr)  and, on the other, the five-way multiplicative interaction between those indices. 
This is half way between a straight average and strict multiplication, meaning the average of 
the two. The index is aggregated using this formula: 
v2x_polyarchy=  .5 MPI +.5 API 
=   .5(v2x_elecoff* v2xel_frefair *v2x_frassoc_thick *v2x_suffr * v2x_free_altinf)  
   + .5(1/8 v2x_elecoff + 1/4 v2xel_frefair + 1/4 v2x_frassoc_thick + 1/8 v2x_suffr + 
1/4 v2x_free_altinf) 
Because most of the variables are strongly correlated, different aggregation formulas 
yield very similar index values. The official formula presented here correlates at .94 to .99 with 
a purely multiplicative formula, a purely additive formula, one that weights the additive terms 
twice as much as the multiplicative term, one that weights the multiplicative term twice as 
much as the additive terms, and one that weights suffrage six times as much as the other 
additive terms.  
The Electoral Democracy Index also serves as the foundation for the other four indices. 
There can be no democracy without elections but, following the canon in each of the traditions 
that argues that electoral democracy is insufficient for a true realization of “rule by the 
people,” there is more to democracy than just elections. We therefore combine the scores for 
our Electoral Democracy Index (v2x_polyarchy) with the scores for the components measuring 
deliberation, equalitarianism, participation, and liberal constitutionalism, respectively. The 
two components, P=Polyarchy and HPC=High Principle Component (liberal, egalitarian, 
participatory, or deliberative),10 are aggregated into general democracy indices. Based on 
extensive deliberations among the authors and other members of the V-Dem research group, 
we arrived at the following aggregation formula:  
                                                          
10 The HPCs are indices based on the aggregation of a large number of indicators (liberal=23, egalitarian=8, participatory=21, 
deliberative=5). 
19 
 
DI = .25*P1.585 + .25*HPC + .5*P1.585*HPC 
The underlying rationale for this formula for all four DIs is the same as that for the 
Electoral Democracy Index: equal weighting of the additive terms and the multiplicative term 
in order to respect both the Sartorian necessary conditions logic and a family resemblance 
logic. The more a country approximates polyarchy, the more its combined DI score reflect the 
unique component. This perspective is a continuous version of theoretical arguments 
presented in the literature saying that polyarchy or electoral democracy conditions should be 
satisfied to a reasonable extent before the other democracy component greatly contributes 
to the high-level index values. At the same time, it reflects the view in the literature that, when 
a certain level of polyarchy is reached, what matters in terms of, say, participatory democracy 
is how much of the participatory property is realized. We specify the rate at which a 
component influence a score by raising the value of a component by 1.585. We identify this 
numeric value by defining an anchor point: when a country has a polyarchy score of .5 (in 
practice, this is a threshold on the Electoral Democracy Index beyond which countries tend to 
be considered electoral democracies in a minimal sense) and its HPC is at its maximum (1), the 
high-level index score should be .5.11 Taken together, these indices offer a fairly 
comprehensive accounting of “varieties of democracy.”  
 
Going Forward 
We believe that with V-Dem democracy research is taking a stride forward and that it also 
contributes to advancing methodologies for use of academic- and other experts to measure 
unobservables in a defensible way. One indication is that the different versions of the dataset 
has been downloaded over 70,000 times by academics, students, and others in over 150 
countries since its first public release on January 4th, 2016. We hope and believe that many 
innovative and hereto undoable research projects will come out of this, and as a result we will 
know more about the causes and consequences of democracy. 
The next version 9 of the V-Dem dataset will continue to expand its reach in areas of 
social media pluralism and the exclusion from governance of various groups. We hope in the 
future to cover also an increasing scope of indicators related to varieties of autocracy and 
                                                          
11 Define the exponent as p. Setting Polyarchy=.5, HPC=1, and HLI=.5, and solving for DI=.25*Polyarchy^p + .25*HPC + 
.5*Polyarchy^p*HPC, p=log(base 0.5) of .25/.75 ≈ 1.585. 
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autocratization – especially relevant given the current trends in the world. We will also 
continue to explore the limitations of our methodology with a view to further refine it and 
share best practices in particular with regards to bringing new data to the world on previously 
unobserved traits with the help of qualified experts. 
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